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UNCLOS III AND THE STRAITS PASSAGE ISSUE: THE
MARITIME POWERS' PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSIT PASSAGE
INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, there has been a trend toward expanded
claims of territorial sea by the nations of the world.' This "creeping
jurisdiction"' has precipitated a growing conflict of interest between
the coastal and maritime nations. s Expansion of coastal state jurisdic-
tion has been motivated by several factors. First, new technology is
making it more feasible for states to economically exploit offshore re-
sources.4 Consequently, states have made expanded claims of national
jurisdiction to ensure that they will have exclusive control of those re-
sources. s Second, considerations of national defense have spurred
states to claim wider territorial seas in an effort to provide themselves
with a security blanket against the presence of foreign military vessels.,
1. R. Dupuy, THE LAW OF THE SEA 14-17 (1974).
2. See Frank, Jumping Ship, 43 FOREIGN POL'Y 123 (1981). Richard Darman,
Vice Chairman of the United States Delegation to the 1977 session of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), has claimed that initially, the
primary reason the United States desired a new Law of the Sea Conference was to stem
the tide of "creeping jurisdiction." Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Inter-
ests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373, 375 (1978). Darman cites some persuasive statistics to illus-
trate the trend of claims to expanded territorial waters by the nations of the world. He
writes:
In the preceding decade, since the close of the first U.N. con-
ference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, the expansionist pat-
tern has become clear. Whereas 54 percent of coastal states
claimed territorial seas of three nautical miles or less in 1958,
a decade later the number had dropped to 35 percent. In the
same period, the number of coastal states claiming territorial
extensions of 12 miles or more increased from 18 percent to 43
percent.
Id. For a tabular display of this same trend, see Burke, Submerged Passage Through
Straits: Interpretation of the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text, 52 WASH. L. REv.
193, 195 n.10 (1977).
3. For a brief discussion of this conflict, see A. HOLLICE, U.S. FoREIGN POLICY
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 15-17 (1981). For a view that conflict between coastal and
maritime states has historically been the dominant theme of the Law of the Sea, see
Shelton & Rose, Freedom of Navigation: The Emerging International Regime, 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 523 (1977).
4. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 6-9.
5. Id. at 10.
6. For a discussion of the role of an expanded territorial sea in offering security
against political pressures exerted by offshore naval fleets, see D. BowErr, THE LAW OF
THE SEA 7-9 (1967). One authority cites the emergence of coastal rights as, in part, an
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Third, in an age of expanded maritime traffic, the coastal states per-
ceive a need to expand jurisdiction over their offshore waters in order
to provide themselves increased regulatory competence in the area of
pollution and safety.7 Fourth, coastal states make expanded jurisdic-
tional claims in an effort to bring larger fishing zones under their ex-
clusive control.8 The maritime powers, however, see this expanding ju-
risdiction as a potential threat to unhampered navigation,' particularly
within the straits."0
historical response against external threats. Smith, The Politics of Lawmaking: Problems
in International Maritime Regulation-Innocent Passage v. Free Passage, 37 U. PiTT.
L. REv. 487, 499-501 (1976). Smith states:
This [concern for security] was to be found in the assertion by
the coastal states of a right to protect their territory and their
citizens from "attack, invasion, interference and injury."
Health had to be protected and so did commerce. The extent
to which the protection given the coastal states would be ap-
plied was to be measured by the state's power to control the
areas of concern.
Id. at 500.
7. Smith, supra note 6, at 542. For a discussion of pollution in the straits, see
Knight, The 1971 United States Proposals on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and
Passages Through International Straits, 51 OR. L. Rsv. 759, 773-75 (1972).
8. D. BowTrr, supra note 6, at 10-12.
9. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 253-54.
10. From the beginning of the negotiations at the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, the United States made it clear that its acceptance of an
expanded territorial sea would be conditioned on resolution of the problem of free pas-
sage through the straits. Smith, supra note 6, at 532.
Article 37, the transit passage section of the proposed draft of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, defines straits as waters "which are used for
international navigation between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and another area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.78, art. 37 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Draft Convention].
For a comprehensive list of straits affected by the expansion of the territorial sea
to 12 miles, see OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEp'T or STATE, PuB. No. 564375, MAP
OF WORLD STRAITS AFFECTED BY A 12-mmu Tmulrromm SA (1974). Relying on these sta-
tistics, Robert E. Osgood compiles a list of 16 straits that could be considered major. He
states:
The strategic importance of straits is a matter of judgment on
which experts may differ, but stretching this category to its
reasonable maximum would produce, according to information
provided by the same chart of the Office of the Geographer, a
list of 16: Gibraltar, two Middle Eastern straits (Bab el
Mandeb and Hormuz), four Southeast Asian straits (Malacca,
Lombok, Sunda and Ombai-Wetar), Western Chosen strait
(between South Korea and Japan), five Caribbean straits (Old
Bahamas Channel, Dominica, Martinique, Saint Lucia Chan-
nel, and Saint Vincent Passage), Dover, Bering, and the Ken-
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Traditionally, the nations of the world have claimed a three-mile
territorial sea." In the straits this has meant that any strait wider than
six miles had a ribbon of high sea waters running through it," ensuring
that navigation is not impeded by claims of jurisdiction by coastal
states."3
The expansion of territorial waters within the straits would mean
that many straits that have been international waterways will become
subject to national jurisdiction. 4 The maritime powers fear that if the
strait states exercised that jurisdiction through the application of regu-
latory power, the right of free passage would become increasingly jeop-
ardized.' 5 Since many of the straits of the world are vital for transit by
both commercial and military vessels, 6 the guarantee of continual free
passage through them is of supreme concern to the maritime powers.
1
7
Under the proposed text of the Draft Convention of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8 a twelve-mile ter-
nedy-Robeson Channels.
Osgood, U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law, 2 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 1, 12 (1974).
11. Stevenson, Who Is to Control the Oceans: U.S. Policy and the 1973 Law of
the Sea Conference, 6 INT'L LAW. 465, 466 (1972).
12. Robertson, Passage Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 801, 804
(1980).
13. More than 100 of the world's largest straits are over six but less than twenty-
four miles wide. As long as states along these straits claim only three-mile territorial
seas, they will remain international straits containing high-seas corridors. Under a
twelve-mile territorial sea, these straits would fall under national jurisdiction and lose
their international character. See Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea,
58 FOREIGN AFF. 902, 905 (1980).
14. See McNees, Freedom of Transit Through International Straits, 6 MAR. L.
& CoM. 175, 183 (1975).
15. Id. at 183-84.
16. See Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 81-82 (1980).
17. In the earliest stages of the development of the new treaty on the Law of the
Sea, the head of the United States delegation, John R. Stevenson, stated that guarantees
of free passage through the world's straits would be necessary elements of any agreement
that would be acceptable to the United States. Stevenson, U.S. Draft Articles on Terri-
torial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted to U.N. Seabeds Committee, 65 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 261, 263-64 (1971) (statement made during a session of Subcommittee II of the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction).
18. Draft Convention, supra note 10. The first session of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea met in December 1973 after many years of pre-
conference preparation. United States participation at the conference has extended
through three previous Administrations, those of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter.
The Draft Convention is currently under "policy review" by the Reagan Administration,
which has reservations concerning the sea-bed portion of the proposed draft. See 81
1982]
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ritorial sea is recognized. 9 This would place all straits under twenty-
four miles wide under national jurisdiction. 0
Presently, international law provides some guarantees of passage
through territorial waters under the regime of innocent passage.2 ' In-
nocent passage has been defined as "a right to use the [territorial] wa-
ters as a highway between two points outside them. . . . (TIhe vessel
is allowed to exercise the right as long as it respects the coastal state
regulations . . . and does not disturb the tranquility of the coastal
state."
The maritime states are dissatisfied with innocent passage.2 3
They believe it gives too much discretion to the coastal states in deter-
mining whether a given passage is innocent ' and, consequently, too
much power to impede or suspend passage.25 They believe such a re-
DEP'T ST. BULL. 48, 48-51 (July 1981) (statement by James L. Malone, Chairman of the
United States delegation to UNCLOS III).
For developments concerning efforts to compromise on the last remaining issue
(the sea-bed mining issue) at the 1982 UNCLOS III session, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 23,
1982, at AS, col. 1.
19. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
20. Stevenson, supra note 11, at 469.
21. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territo-
rial Sea Convention].
22. Smith, supra note 6, at 504. Under the Draft Convention, innocent passage is
defined as "navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) traversing that
sea without entering internal waters." Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 18(1)(a).
There is the added requirement set out in article 18(2) that "[plassage shall be continu-
ous and expeditious." Id. art. 18(2). Article 19(1) states that "[p]assage is innocent as
long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state." Id.
art. 19(1).
23. See Burke, supra note 2, at 196. Professor Burke has written that "disquiet"
over innocent passage has arisen for three major reasons. He states:
First, the doctrine of innocent passage established in the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
provides for a wide discretion in the coastal state to determine
whether passage is innocent, and this subjectivity in judgment
might result in interference with inoffensive passage. Second,
aircraft do not enjoy the right of innocent passge. Third, sub-
marines must travel on the surface in order to exercise the
right . . .the above aspects of the innocent passage concept
make its usefulness questionable ... in the eyes of the major
maritime states, i.e., the United States and the U.S.S.R.
Id.
24. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 803.
25. See, e.g., Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 21, art. 16(1). Article 16(1)
states that "[t]he coastal state may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to pre-
vent passage which is not innocent." Id. A number of coastal states have interpreted
innocent passage to allow them to prevent passage of certain types of vessels, including
[Vol. 3
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gime is not adequate for safeguarding their interests in regard to free
passage through the straits. "
It was in response to this conflict between the maritime powers'
demand for guarantees of unrestricted passage through the straits and
the strait states' demands for regulatory competence over their off-
shore waters that the concept of transit passage was formulated.27
The right of transit passage, as envisioned in the text of the Draft
Convention, can be directly traced to a compromise proposal made by
the United Kingdom at a stage in the negotiations when progress was
at a standstill."8 This proposal fell short of the expectations of those
participants who had hoped for the equivalent of high seas rights
super-tankers and nuclear-powered vessels, because of the nature of the cargo or because
of the vessels' destination. See Stevenson, supra note 11, at 469.
26. In 1974 the United States representative to UNCLOS III, John Norton
Moore, expressed United States opposition to the extension of the innocent passage re-
gime into international straits. He instead called for creation of a regime especially for
the straits. Statement by John Norton Moore in a session of Committee II on July 22,
1974, 71 DEI"T ST. BULL. 409, 409-10 (1974). Moore stated:
The U.S. delegation has stated on numerous occasions the
central importance that we attach to a satisfactory treaty re-
gime of unimpeded transit through and over straits used for
international navigation. Indeed, for straits bordering as well
as states whose ships and aircraft transit such straits, there
could not be a successful Law of the Sea Conference unless
this question is satisfactorily resolved. The inadequacies of the
traditional doctrine of innocent passage-a concept developed
not for transit through straits but for passage through a nar-
row belt of territorial sea-are well known.
Id.
27. For a discussion of the demands and expectations of both the strait and mar-
itime states concerning a new straits regime, see generally Knight, supra note 7.
28. The term "transit passage" was introduced by the United Kingdom in a
statement released in 1975. See Second Committee, Eleventh Meeting, Summary
Records, 2 UNCLOS III Off. Rec. 101, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.1-46 (1974) (state-
ment of Mr. Dudgeon (U.K.)). See also Robertson, supra note 12, at 819. Robertson, in
discussing that United Kingdom proposal, stated:
The United Kingdom introduced the concept of "transit pas-
sage" through straits which are used for international naviga-
tion and which join two parts of the high seas. The proposal
was an honest attempt by the United Kingdom to find a mid-
dle ground between the U.S. and Soviet freedom-of-navigation
and over-flight proposals on the one hand, and proposals that
merely would have tinkered with the doctrine of innocent pas-
sage on the other. The introduction of the new term, "transit
passage," had the advantage of avoiding the excess baggage
carried by the earlier proposals on both sides.
1982]
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through the straits, but, arguably, this was never realistic1 9 From the
outset, United States negotiators realized that the strait states would
have to be given some prescriptive, and possibly some enforcement,
competence."0
It now appears, for all practical purposes, that the Draft Conven-
tion concerning transit passage (and innocent passage) is complete.
8 '
The transit passage section reveals an obvious effort at compromise be-
tween the strait states' demands for regulatory competence over their
territorial waters and the maritime powers' demands for a straits re-
gime that would guarantee less restricted passage through the straits
than under the innocent passage regime.""
This note will evaluate the concept of transit passage as
29. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 293. From the beginning, it was understood
that strait state concerns over environmental and traffic safety issues had to be accom-
modated. For example, it was recognized that the strait states would have to be able to
designate corridors for transit of vessels in crowded straits. The maritime powers were
interested in keeping these "accommodations" to a minimum, and in achieving resolu-
tion of the straits issue in a way ensuring the least restrictive possible transit. Id.
30. In 1971, United States representative John Stevenson indicated United
States willingness to accommodate legitimate coastal demands, as long as those demands
were reasonable and did not threaten the right of free passage. Statement of Mr. Steven-
son at the Eighth Meeting of Subcommittee II, Aug. 3, 1971, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/
SR.4-23, at 45 (1971). Mr. Stevenson stated:
Should a vessel conduct any other activities [except transit]
that are in violation of coastal State laws and regulations, it
would be exceeding the scope of its right, and would be sub-
ject to appropriate enforcement action by the coastal State.
When we refer to enforcement of coastal State laws and
regulations, we intend to include reasonable traffic safety reg-
ulations both for vessels and aircraft. We will, of course, want
to approach this question cautiously in order to preserve the
basic right of free transit and avoid a situation in which the
coastal State has a legal basis for using safety regulations as a
way of impairing the right of free transit.
Id.
31. On April 30, 1982 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea adopted a treaty to govern the use and exploitation of the seas by a vote of 130-4.
The United States, Turkey, Venezuela and Israel voted against the treaty. The Soviet
Union, United Kingdom and West Germany were among fourteen states that abstained.
Opposition to the treaty stemmed primarily from provisions regulating the mining of
manganese nodules from the deep seabed. It is believed that the opposition of major
industrialized states will undermine the effectiveness of the treaty. Nossiter, U.N.
Adopts Sea Law; U.S. Votes No, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at A9, col. 1. For a discussion
of the Reagan Administration's decision to re-evaluate and possibly renegotiate the sea-
bed portion of the UNCLOS III treaty, see generally Frank, supra note 2.
32. See Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 532-33. For a detailed history of the
negotiating process and the evolution of the compromise that eventually became the pro-
posed transit passage articles, see generally Robertson, supra note 12.
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presented in the Draft Convention and assess its utility in addressing
the strategic and commercial needs of the maritime powers.
Background to UNCLOS III and the Straits-Passage Issue
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,"s
which met in 1958, codified the bulk of customary sea law as it existed
at that time."4 It could not agree, however, on a solution to the problem
of expanding territorial sea claims, because the coastal and maritime
powers could not reach a compromise on a territorial sea limit satisfac-
tory to their perceptions of their own individual policy needs. 5
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea' s
met in 1960 for the purpose of achieving some international consensus
on the breadth of the territorial sea. This conference failed in its ob-
jective because maritime states favoring a three-mile territorial sea and
coastal states wishing to extend coastal jurisdiction could not agree on
a compromise.3*
It should be pointed out that many maritime nations, including
the United States, are also coastal states. The problem of representing
these conflicting interests often results in inconsistent policies.3" As a
33. The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter
cited as UNCLOS I] adopted four international conventions: (1) Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; (2) Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; (3) Convention on the Continental Shelf, done
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; (4) Convention on the
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done April 29, 1958,
17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S. 285. Also negotiated was the Optional
Protocol of Signature Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, opened for signa-
ture April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169. For a brief history of the Law of the Sea, including
the UNCLOS I Conference and the negotiations in the early and middle stages of UN-
CLOS III, see generally Smith, supra note 6.
34. Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 525.
35. See McNees, supra note 14, at 181-82.
36. See generally Bowett, The Second United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, 9 Ir'L & COMP. L.Q. 415 (1960).
37. See Smith, supra note 6, at 508.
38. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 150-58. Although the Conference could not
agree on a compromise on the breadth of the territorial sea, one proposal calling for a
six-mile territorial sea plus a six-mile fishing zone narrowly missed passage. Id.
39. See generally id. Within the United States, there were many divergent forces
exerting policy expectations. National security and commercial navigation interests fa-
vored a policy restricting the trend toward "creeping jurisdiction." Resource and fishery
interests favored the trend toward increased territorial sea and fishery resource zones.
For a discussion of the development of United States policy as a result of these conflict-
ing pressures, see generally A. HOLLICK, supra note 3.
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coastal power, the United States, for one, was in a position to benefit
from this "creeping jurisdiction."4 Certainly it had much to gain by
being able to make expanded claims over offshore resources and
fisheries.4 ' The United States also recognized the need to exercise
greater national control over offshore pollution.4 But as a naval and
maritime power, the United States perceived this trend toward expan-
sion as potentially conflicting with traditional rights of free navigation.
These latter considerations were considered more important and usu-
ally prevailed in policy decisions. 43 The United States was concerned
that just as expanded jurisdiction could allow it to exclude others from
exploiting its offshore resources and fisheries, that same power could
be used by others to exclude it from such activities in other parts of
the world.
44
The greatest concern of the maritime powers, however, was the
effect expanded state jurisdiction would have on those straits that were
traditionally high seas corridors, but which, under a twelve-mile sea,
would become engulfed by the territorial seas of the bordering strait
states. This means that in many of the world's most commercially and
militarily important straits,5 where there was once freedom of naviga-
tion, there would now exist only the right of innocent passage.46
Innocent passage as a regime was tolerable to the maritime pow-
ers under the historic three-mile territorial sea, since it affected only a
40. The proposed draft treaty drawn up by UNCLOS III allows for a 12-mile
territorial sea and a 200-mile economic zone. The United States conceded these two
items in return for navigational rights. One authority points out that as a coastal state
with one of the richest and largest offshore areas, the United States was greatly benefited
by its own concessions. Frank, supra note 2, at 124-25.
41. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 18.
42. See Stevenson, supra note 11, at 468.
43. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 196-239. Hollick describes the formulation
of United States policy prior to UNCLOS III, and the reasons why United States policy
makers considered navigational and national security interests more important than the
United States interests in its role as a coastal state. Id.
44. See Stevenson, supra note 11, at 469.
45. See Richardson, supra note 13, at 905. Richardson stated:
All the world's most important straits would be subject to
these restrictions (of coastal regulation); for example, the
Strait of Gibraltar separating the Atlantic Ocean from the
Mediteranean Sea; the links between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, including the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as well
as the gateways to the Indonesian archipelago; the Strait of
Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; and the Bab el
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limited amount of water.47 Yet the three-mile limit is becoming a thing
of the past, and a twelve-mile territorial sea is becoming accepted as
customary international law.4 ' Acceptance of the Draft Convention by
most of the nations of the world would demonstrate the general accept-
ance of the twelve-mile limit.
A twelve-mile territorial area, if recognized within the world's
straits, would enclose 116 previously international straits under the in-
nocent passage regime.4 9 An innocent passage regime within the straits
would not be acceptable to the maritime states." They claim that in-
nocent passage gives too much regulatory competence to the coastal
state.5 ' As provided by the 1958 Convention of the Territorial Sea and
Continguous Zone, 52 the coastal state has wide discretion to determine
whether a passage is innocent."' This allowance of "subjectivity in
judgment might result in interference with inoffensive passage."54 Sec-
ond, under innocent passage, aircraft do not enjoy the right of over-
flight.56 Third, the innocent passage regime requires submarines to sur-
47. One authority has stated that the expansion of the territorial sea from three
to twelve miles will reduce the area of high seas in the world by 3,000,000 square miles.
Pirtle, Transit Rights and U.S. Security Interests in International Straits: The "Straits
Debate" Revisited, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 477, 479 (1978).
48. The overwhelming majority of nations already. recognize a 12-mile (or larger)
territorial sea. See Moore, supra note 16, at 86. One writer has noted that the United
States is conceding little when it offers to recognize a 12-mile territorial sea, since the 12-
mile limit is already recognized as customary international law and the United States
itself presently enforces such a de facto limit. See Knight, supra note 7, at 767-68.
49. Maduro, Passage Through International Straits: The Prospects Emerging
from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 12 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 65, 69 (1980).
50. The United States regards innocent passage as inadequate to safeguard its
interests. See Statement by Mr. Stevenson at the Eighth Meeting of Subcommittee II,
supra note 30, at 45-46. Mr. Stevenson stated:
[For] example, some States consider "innocence" to be a sub-
jective criterion to be left to the discretion of the coastal
State. Some argue that passage of certain types of vessels is
inherently non-innocent, or that innocence may depend on the
flag, cargo, or destination of a vessel. Under the Territorial
Sea Convention, neither aircraft nor submerged submarines
have a right of innocent passage.
Id.
51. See Moore, supra note 16, at 85-86.
52. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 21.
53. Id. art. 16. See also Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 533.
54. Burke, supra note 2, at 196. Among the abuses of power the maritime powers
fear from the coastal states are the setting of prohibitive fees, the imposition of unrea-
sonable environmental standards and the outright closing of a strait. Darman, supra
note 2, at 382.
55. Moore, supra note 16, at 85.
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face in order to exercise the right of passage," making the utility of the
regime suspect to the major maritime powers, particularly the United
States and the Soviet Union.
5 7
Underlying the maritime powers' concern over innocent passage is
the fear that the strait states might use their newly-found regulatory
competence in a discriminatory or abusive fashion." Many of the
straits serve as indispensable conduits for much of the world's oil sup-
ply.59 Also, as innocent passage demands that submarines surface, 60 the
superpowers are worried that this would minimize the ability of sub-
marines to navigate undetected, thus making them more vulnerable to
attack." Hence, for both commercial and national security reasons, the
maritime powers have serious reservations about the ability of an inno-
cent passage regime to protect their particular interests."
The maritime states looked to the treaty-making process to real-
ize their demands and expectations for a new straits regime" that
would ensure the least restrictive possible transit through the straits.
6
4
UNCLOS III was convened to resolve many conflicts that were not ad-
equately resolved by the then-current law of the sea." The most urgent
56. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 21, art. 14(6).
57. See Burke, supra note 2, at 196.
58. See McNees, supra note 14, at 183-84. McNees writes:
(N]o maritime state wishes for its rights of navigation to de-
pend upon the subjective decision of another State as to what
affects its "peace, good order and security." The fear is that a
State's oil tankers, fishing vessels, warships, research vessels,
nuclear-powered ships, or cargo vessels carrying any produc-
tion competition with a principal export of the coastal State,
might at any time be barred as not being in "innocent
passage."
Id.
59. See Moore, supra note 16, at 81. Among the most important "oil" straits are
Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, and Malacca. Darman, supra note 2, at 382.
60. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 21, art. 14(6).
61. Richardson, supra note 13, at 905.
62. See Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 533. For a discussion of the view shared
by some nations that innocent passage represented a good balance between coastal and
maritime interests, see Robertson, supra note 12, at 813.
63. See Stevenson, supra note 11, at 474. But see Pirtle, supra note 47, at 489.
Pirtle voices the view that it is unlikely that strait states would suspend or restrict pas-
sage since they too derive benefit from the commerce that flows through straits and
would actually be disproportionately harmed by any interference with that commerce.
Id.
64. Maduro, supra note 49, at 69.
65. UNCLOS III was convened to address a spectrum of problems dealing with
such law of the sea subjects as the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea,
fishing, conservation and pollution. See Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 526.
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of those conflicts regarded the expanding jurisdictional claims to the
world's seas which threatened to "nationalize" the world's oceans and
waterways." Chief among the conference's priorities was the creation
of a new, innovative straits regime and a seabed regime.6 7 Research has
indicated that technology exists or is available on the horizon that
would make possible the exploitation of stores of manganese nodules
containing nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese which lie on the ocean
floor." The major questions to be decided were how, by whom, and for
whose benefit these valuable minerals and resources would be ex-
ploited. 9 If left unregulated, only the most technologically advanced
nations would be able to benefit from these riches.
7 0
Even here, the lack of international legal protection was a dis-
couraging factor to potential investors.7 1 In addition, the world's less-
developed nations contended that since the oceans have long been
deemed to belong to all nations, any riches found should be used for
the benefit of all nations.
7
UNCLOS III faced the task of accommodating the many legiti-
mate yet conflicting demands and expectations of the world commu-
nity into a workable compromise. The maritime powers made it clear
from the start that any concessions on their part on the seabed and
resource issues would have to be met by reciprocal concessions on the
part of other nations on navigational issues.
7
1
The questions to be addressed then are to what degree does this
66. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 9-11. Stevenson has stated that the trend
toward the partitioning of the oceans represents a challenge to modernize the law of the
sea and its institutions in a way adequate to obtain international agreement. Stevenson,
supra note 11, at 477.
67. A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 240.
68. Id. at 8.
69. See Frank, supra note 2, at 123-24. For a discussion of the trend toward
claims of 200-mile economic zones by the world's nations in an effort to bring more of
these resources under their control, see Richardson, supra note 13, at 905-06.
70. One authority has recommended that the industrial powers not cooperate in
the establishment of the sea-bed authority "Enterprise", claiming it is unwise to set up a
sea-bed authority with their own capital and technology, only to see its earnings benefit
others. See Goldwin, Locke and the Law of the Sea, 46 COMMENTARY 49 (1981).
71. See Frank, supra note 2, at 135.
72. In February 1609, Hugo Grotius enunciated the thesis that the sea could not
in fact be occupied. It was intended by nature to be free to all. Smith, supra note 6, at
494. For an argument that Grotius' thesis could be easily used to support the contention
that the seas are free to all nations to exploit without any moral duty to share the
bounty with other nations, see Goldwin, supra note 70, at 49.
73. Richardson, supra note 13, at 911. Elliot Richardson, chief United States ne-
gotiator to UNCLOS III during the Carter Administration, has stated that "its partici-
pants have understood from the outset that the accommodation of navigational and re-
source interests must be at the core of any eventual 'package deal.'" Id.
19821
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
treaty represent an improvement over innocent passage, and to what
extent does it protect the interests of the participants in this treaty-
making process?
Problem of Interpretation
Considerable debate exists concerning the appropriate means of
interpretation to be applied to the transit passage section of the Draft
Convention. Important interpretative problems have arisen because of
the textual omissions and vagueness that resulted from the effort to
achieve a compromise between the interests of the coastal and mari-
time states."4 Most of the debate has centered on whether to resort to a
textual or contextual approach to interpretation." As there is much
74. Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 534. One author, Ann Hollick, has con-
tended that the treaty framers purposely resorted to ambiguous language when faced
with strongly-contested issues that could not otherwise be resolved. Hollick states: "[tihe
merit of ambiguity is that it leaves it to state practice to determine the evolution of
customary law and the interpretation of the treaty." A. HOLLicK, supra note 3, at 15.
75. For example, Robertson has endorsed a textual interpretation of the Pro-
posed Draft since there is little formal negotiating history available upon which to base a
more contextual interpretation. Robertson, supra note 12, at 936-37. Those authorities
recommending a textualist approach usually cite "the absence of a formal record of the
travaux." Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of In-
ternational Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 55-56. The textualists are uncomfortable
with an interpretation of the Draft Convention that would rely on "undocumented un-
derstandings" to fulfill some of our most important national security and commercial
interests. They would have preferred that the framers had put into express writing pro-
visions to safeguard these interests. Reisman, while not a textualist, is also uncomforta-
ble with the contextualist approach in regard to the transit passage articles of the Draft
Convention. Reisman states:
The idea of an "undocumented understanding" among all or
even most of the more than 150 delegations of the LOS Con-
ference is preposterous, and the lawyer who would believe it,
advise reliance on it, or invoke it before a tribunal would be
very naive indeed. . . . If the plain and natural meaning of
the ICNT text is against these understandings, then they are
unlikely to survive changes of government in the strait states,
if that long. Why there should be an understanding on some-
thing so important at a meeting whose manifest function is to
articulate norms on the subject is also puzzling.
Id. at 75.
But see Burke, supra note 2, at 202-03. Burke rejects a textualist approach and
contends that a contextual approach can be based on important features of the negotiat-
ing process which are available, including the nature of the issues involved, how they
came to be formulated, by whom, what proposals were made by what particular partici-
pants, and how these proposals were interpreted by the parties to the treaty-making
process. Burke argues that a textualist approach cannot be relied on to accurately reveal
the intentions of the parties. He states:
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disagreement in the international law community on this point, this
note will not limit itself to any one particular theory of interpretation,
but will utilize both a textual and a contextual approach in analyzing
this agreement.
Issues in Controversy
How well the proposed transit passage regime is perceived to
meet the expectations and demands of the maritime powers depends
upon the interpretation of the treaty as it applies to two central issues.
The first issue is the extent of regulatory competence to be given to the
coastal or strait states. The second issue is whether the right of sub-
merged passage for submarines is to be permitted within the straits
under transit passage.
Strait State Regulatory Competence
The controversy concerning regulatory competence under the
There is a loss of plausibility when the interpreter makes no
attempt to take into account the issues being negotiated, their
origin, the contrasting views and proposals of the principal
participants, contemporary interpretations of these proposals,
and the formulation of the outcome in relation to these com-
munications among the parties in the negotiations. These fac-
tors assist in determining the perspectives of those concerned.
Id. at 202.
Moore agrees with the contention that the formal record is "sketchy." He states,
however, that "it is not merely formal travaux that the Vienna Convention contemplates
as a supplementary means of interpretation but also more generally 'the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.'" Moore, supra note 16, at
89. Moore states further: "When the permissable context is thus broadened as it should
be, there is a great deal of relevant evidence that must be considered and that strongly
supports the interpretations Reisman questions." Id.
Professor Myres McDougal, in rejecting the textualist approach states: "It is the
grossest, least defensible exercise of arbitrary formalism to arrogate to one particular set
of signs-the text of a document-the role of serving as the exclusive index of the par-
ties' shared expectations." M. McDOUGAL, H. LASWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION
OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967). The authors go on to state:
[T]he effective interpretation of an international agreement is
not, and cannot be made, a simple and mechanical routine.
The communications which constitute an international agree-
ment, like all other communications, are functions of a larger
context, and the realistic identification of the content of these
communications must require a systematic, comprehensive ex-
amination of all the relevant features of that context.
Id. at 11.
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transit passage regime revolves around the questions of who will pre-
scribe regulations; what standards will govern; who will enforce them;
and what guarantees for free passage will be given. Answers to these
questions will have far-ranging economic and national security conse-
quences for the maritime powers.
One of the great dissatisfactions under the regime of innocent
passage was, and is, that the coastal states have been given so much
discretion in the application of their regulatory power within the terri-
torial sea.7' A leading authority has stated that the three major weak-
nesses of the innocent passage regime under UNCLOS I that made it
unacceptable to the maritime and naval powers were: "(1) the lack of
precision with respect to interpretation and application of coastal-state
rights; (2) the application of the right to only specific forms of transit;
and (3) the fact that the right had been withdrawn periodically by
coastal states in support of political objectives."
7
Supporters of the proposed transit passage regime contend that,
while it provides for the strait states to maintain their right to pre-
scribe regulations over a variety of activities, many safeguards are built
into the system to protect against the hampering or suspension of
passage.
The Draft Convention reveals a clear intent to ensure that regula-
tions would be consistent with international law. 78 For example, article
41(1) allows a strait state to "designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic
separation schemes for navigation," but article 41(3) adds that such
schemes "must conform to generally accepted international regula-
tions."80 In addition, article 41(4) provides that any proposals by the
strait states concerning the designation or substitution of traffic
schemes be referred "to the competent international organization with
a view to their adoption." '81 Article 42(1)(b), which grants each strait
state regulatory control over "discharge of oil, oily wastes and other
noxious substances in the strait,"" limits that regulatory power to
"giving effect to applicable international regulations. '8 3 Clearly, the
framers did incorporate into the text safeguards against the prescribing
76. For a lengthy and scholarly discussion concerning authority over the territo-
rial sea, see M. McDOUGAL & W. T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THlE OCEANS 173-304
(1962).
77. Pirtle, supra note 47, at 481.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83.
79. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 41(1).
80. Id. art. 41(3).
81. Id. art. 41(4).
82. Id. art. 42(1)(b).
83. Id.
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by a strait state of regulations inconsistent with the spirit of interna-
tional law.
Enforcement is another issue of great importance to the maritime
powers. Their greatest fear is that the strait states might try to unilat-
erally enforce their regulations and, thereby, impede free passage.8"
Reisman believes that article 39 gives regulatory and enforcement com-
petence to the strait states.65 He reasons that by establishing a set of
flag state duties, it must be assumed that the strait states have a corre-
sponding set of rights to enforce those duties.8" He states:
The correlative of a duty is a right. Though Arti-
cle 39 speaks of user duties, it necessarily imports
coastal rights. It must be construed as allowing
the coastal states a broad prescriptive and appli-
cative competence with regard to transit passage
unless we are to assume that the 'duties' are not
more than moral imprecations.
6 7
As stated above, article 39 does set out a number of "user du-
ties."88 In addition, there is validity to Reisman's analysis that this
necessarily imports "coastal rights." It has been argued, however, that
these rights cannot be exercised unilaterally by the strait states to sus-
pend passage, but must be enforced through diplomatic channels and
third-party mediation.6 ' One particular problem is that the transit pas-
84. See Reisman, supra note 75, at 69.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Reisman goes on to state: "Because these are legal duties and hence re-
quire characteristics that the coastal state must assess, 'transit passage' takes on many of
the features of innocent passage." Id. at 70.
88. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 39. Article 39 lists the duties to be
observed by ships and aircraft during their passage. These duties include proceeding
without delay through or over straits, refraining from the use of force against any strait
state, and refraining from activities other than those incident to their normal mode "un-
less rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress." In addition, they must "comply
with generally accepted international regulations and procedures and practices for
safety," and for prevention and reduction of pollution. Id.
89. Moore agrees that article 39 establishes user duties and "necessarily imports
coastal rights," and that a duty infers a correlative right. He does not agree that this
gives the strait states a unilateral right of enforcement. Moore, supra note 16, at 106.
Moore states:
That the coastal state has rights correlative to the Article 39
flag state duties does not mean that they are unilateral rights
to suspend transit passage, and much less that they are of pre-
scriptive and applicative competence ....
Counter to the Reisman theory, the whole structure of
UNCLOS serves to decouple transit passage rights from flag
19821
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sage articles do not expressly state what international organizations the
framers contemplated would enforce regulations in the straits."° It has
been suggested that the strait states may have to enter into additional
treaties to acquire authority to enforce certain regulations. 91 This is
just another example of the confusion resulting from the failure of the
framers to transform their intentions into express language.
The transit passage text is ambiguous on how regulations are to
be enforced, but there is strong support for the view that enforcement
will not rest with the strait states. Proponents of the treaty point out
that nowhere in the transit passage articles is express power given to
the strait states to enforce regulations except under one extraordinary
situation, the threat "of major environmental damage."' 2 In such a
case, article 233 will allow the strait state to take "appropriate enforce-
ment measures.' 3 The fact that the framers expressly granted enforce-
ment power to the strait states in this instance indicates that where
they' wanted to give enforcement power to the strait states, they ex-
pressly provided for it. 9' Nowhere else in the transit passage section
have they done so.96 Proponents argue that this is indicative of the
framers' intentions that no other strait state enforcement power was
contemplated.96
A comparison of the articles under the innocent passage section
with those under the transit passage section supports the view that the
drafters had no intention of extending nearly as much regulatory au-
thority to the strait states under the transit passage regime. There is
no transit passage equivalent of the innocent passage articles 21 and
22, which give a lengthy and detailed portrayal of the strait states'
rights of prescription. 9 7 Under transit passage, only article 42 imports
to give regulatory competence to the strait states and such competence
state obligations .... That is, they are rights (not merely
,'moral imprecations") to be pursued through diplomatic
channels or, where applicable, third-party dispute settlement,
but certainly not unilateral action by the strait state.
Id. at 106-07.
90. Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 536.
91. Id.
92. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 233. The Draft Convention states: "[If
a foreign ship other than those referred to in section 10 has committed a violation of the
laws and regulations referred to in article 42, paragraph 1 (a) and (b), causing or threat-
ening major damage to the marine environment of the straits, the States bordering the
straits may take appropriate enforcement measures .... '" Id.
93. Id.
94. See Moore, supra note 16, at 104.
95. See Draft Convention, supra note 10, arts. 34-44.
96. See Moore, supra note 16, at 104.
97. Draft Convention, supra note 10, arts. 21-22.
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is limited to four instances.98 First, under article 42(1)(a), strait states
may enact laws regulating the "safety of navigation and the regulation
of marine traffic as provided in article 41." '9 Second, under article
42(1)(b), regulations may be passed for "[tihe prevention, reduction
and control of pollution."' 100 Third, "[w]ith respect to fishing vessels,
the prevention of fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear" may be
regulated under article 42(1)(c).' ° ' Fourth, the strait state is allowed to
prescribe regulations concerning "[tihe taking on board or putting
overboard of any commodity, currency or person in contravention of
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations of states bor-
dering straits."' 02 These are the only instances where express regula-
tory competence is granted under transit passage. The far fewer in-
stances of express extension -of prescriptive competence to the strait
states under transit passage and the greater safeguards against abuse
appear to represent a serious effort on the part of the framers to meet
some of the maritime powers' demands for an improved straits
regime.'0 3
An examination of article 25 of the innocent passage section pro-
vides, by way of comparison, one example of the improvement the
transit passage regime represents to the maritime powers. Under arti-
cle 25(1), the coastal state "may take the necessary steps in its territo-
rial sea to prevent passge which is not innocent.' ' 0 4 Article 25(3) pro-
vides that the "coastal state may, without discrimination amongst
foreign ships suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial
sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential
for the protection of its security, including weapons exercises." 0 5
There is no equivalent to article 25 under transit passage allowing the
strait states such power to take unilateral steps to enforce laws and
regulations. Nor is there any equivalent under transit passage to article
30 of the innocent passage section that permits the coastal state to
require a warship to leave its territorial waters where that "warship
does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state con-
cerning passage through its territorial sea and disregards any request
for compliance which is made to it."' One can argue that if the fram-
98. Id. art. 42.
99. Id. art. 42(1)(a).
100. Id. art. 42(1)(b).
101. Id. art. 42(1)(c).
102. Id. art. 42(1)(d).
103. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 851.
104. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 25(1).
105. Id. art. 25(3).
106. Id. art. 30.
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ers wanted the strait states to have the same enforcement powers
under transit passage that they would have under innocent passage,
the framers would have expressly granted such powers.
10 7
As previously stated, only article 42 imports to give prescriptive
competence to the strait states.' Proponents of the transit passage
regime state that even this narrow competence is qualified by other
articles that constrain the strait state from effectively impeding or
blocking transit.' 9 The maritime powers are concerned that the strait
states may exercise their narrow prescriptive competence to promul-
gate regulations that would have the practical effect of making "pas-
sage burdensome or impossible."" 0
Among the safeguards against such a possibility of hampered or
suspended passage is article 38(1), which provides: "all ships and air-
craft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded
.. ,"' This article would make it very difficult for a strait state to
ban any type of vessel from its waters. The use of the word "all" ap-
pears to make the article include every type of vessel." 2 The maritime
powers' apprehensions that the passage of supertankers, warships and
submarines might be impeded should be partially alleviated by this ar-
ticle." 3 Article 42(2) directly meets those concerns by stating: "Such
laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact amongst
foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of deny-
ing, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage. . . ."'" Rob-
ertson states that article 42(2) "ensures that the principle of nondis-
crimination among foreign ships must be respected in all coastal-state
regulations for transit passage. ' ' H5
Finally, article 44 expressly meets the maritime powers' appre-
hensions by stating that "[s]tates bordering straits shall not hamper
transit passage . . . . There shall be no suspension of transit
passage."" 6
Moore contends that there are adequate safeguards under transit
107. See Moore, supra note 16, at 102-05.
108. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 42.
109. Id. arts. 38(1), 42(2), 44. See infra text accompanying notes 111-17.
110. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 838. He states: "it is not likely that imped-
iments to free transit would be imposed by a flat prohibition of passage. Rather, States
would act as they have in connection with innocent passage through the territorial
sea-by using the power to regulate to make passage burdensome or impossible. Id.
111. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 38(1).
112. Robertson, supra note 12, at 838.
113. See id.
114. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 42(2).
115. Robertson, supra note 12, at 839.
116. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 44.
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passage to protect the maritime powers' interests concerning un-
restricted navigation: "As a result of both the narrowness of coastal
state regulatory competence and the strong safeguard provisions of the
UNCLOS text, coastal states are not given authority to suspend or
hamper submerged transit, overflight, or other essential components of
the transit passage regime. '"11
Although a reading of the text supports the view that prescriptive
competence would be very narrow under transit passage and that strait
state enforcement power would be limited to the exception of article
233, the bottom line on any textual reading leaves ambiguity on many
key issues. The absence of clear and unambiguous language creates the
danger that the treaty's provisions might later be interpreted contrary
to the maritime powers' vital interests.11
Treaty adherents maintain that a more contextual approach to
treaty interpretation would clarify possible ambiguities by resorting to
sources other than the text, such as the negotiating history and the
stated intentions of the parties to the treaty-making process.11 9 They
claim such an approach will reveal that the expectations of the mari-
time states have been substantially satisfied by the transit passage
regime.'2"
The coastal states' regulatory competence covering a broad vari-
ety of activities was one of the maritime powers' chief criticisms of the
innocent passage regime. 2 ' There is much reason to believe that the
maritime powers would not have gone along with the concept of transit
passage if it vested any significant amount of prescriptive or applica-
tive competence in the strait states. 2 John Norton Moore, acting as
United States representative to UNCLOS III in 1973, made United
States intentions clear: "In view of the importance of straits used for
international navigation, any regime for such straits which depended
upon a set of criteria that could be subjectively interpreted by straits
states would sow the seeds of future conflict and undercut a major goal
117. Moore, supra note 16, at 106.
118. See Reisman, supra note 75, at 76. Reisman argues that there are two kinds
of ambiguities, yours and the other fellow's. It is his fear that in the case of the Proposed
Draft, the other fellow's version would prevail. Id.
119. Moore, supra note 16, at 87-90.
120. See id. Moore contends that either a contextual or textual interpretation of
the Proposed Text will reveal that the transit passage regime is adequate to meet the
needs of the maritime powers. Id.
121. See Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 530-33.
122. Moore, supra note 16, at 108. For a view that the transit passage regime
does not adequately protect the legitimate needs of the strait states in regulating their
offshore waters, see Maduro, supra note 49, at 73.
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of the Conference.
'1 2 3
The importance the United States ascribes to having unrestricted
use of the world's waterways was stated forcefully by Secretary of
State Kissinger in 1975, when he declared that the United States
would "not join in an agreement which leaves any uncertainty about
the right to use world communication routes without interference."'2 4
Any regime allowing the strait states great subjective discretion in the
prescription and application of regulations would not have been ac-
ceptable to the United States and other maritime powers." 5 Any inter-
pretation recognizing such strait state competence is inconsistent with
the intent of the parties to this treaty.'
It is not unusual for an international legal regime to allow a na-
tion to prescribe regulations without giving it the power to unilaterally
enforce them.12 7 Such a design is consistent with practices of custom-
ary international law.'
A final problem that must be discussed is the possibility that a
strait state could bypass the restrictions on its applicative power under
the transit passage regime by simply declaring a passage non-transit,
just as a passage can be deemed non-innocent under innocent pas-
sage. 9 Reisman has indicated that this could be done if a passage vio-
lated any of the flagship duties cited in article 39(1).111 Reisman claims
that once a passage is deemed by the strait state to be in violation of
article 39(1), it can be declared to no longer be a transit passage and
thereby is not entitled to the appropriate safeguards.' 3 ' For example,
123. Statement by John Norton Moore, United States representative to the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction, April 2, 1973, USUN Press Release No. 32(73), at 2 (April 3,
1973).
124. Address by Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, before the American Bar
Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, Dept. of State Press Release No. 408,
at 5 (August 11, 1975).
125. See A. HOLLICK, supra note 3, at 235-36.
126. Moore, supra note 16, at 108.
127. Id. at 104.
128. Id. He writes:
Indeed, a "flag state obligation" approach, which creates obli-
gations but not direct rights of enforcement in other states, is
a principal underpinning of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas. Not surprisingly, this result is again consistent
with the use of the phrase "freedom of navigation" in the
straits chapter taken from that convention.
Id.
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such a passage would no longer be entitled to the assurances of article
44, which states that nations bordering straits shall not hamper or sus-
pend passage.'
32
This interpretation has been criticized as being unfounded by
John Norton Moore, who states that the flagship duties imposed by
article 39 do not conversely give the strait states a unilateral right to
suspend passage.' 33 Instead, he argues, the strait states' recourse will
be through "normal diplomatic (and if available, judicial) channels." "
Moore perceives this conception of non-transit as a misguided ef-
fort to impose the logic of innocent passage upon transit passage. 5
Such an imposition is contrary to the whole spirit of transit passage,
which was an effort to negotiate a regime ensuring unsuspended pas-
sage. If the framers intended the strait states to have the power to
declare a passage "non-transit," they would have expressly provided
for it' s as they did under article 25 for innocent passage, allowing a
coastal state to declare a passage non-innocent.'
3 7
Burke agrees with Reisman that the strait states may be able to
declare a passage "non-transit" but contends that this can be done
only on a case-by-case basis.' s While this possibility of a "non-transit"
declaration is recognized by two distinguished international law
authorites, it is unlikely that negotiators would allow a "loop hole" to
exist that could undo all the other safeguards and guarantees they ne-
gotiated for to protect the maritime powers' vital interests in free navi-
gation of the straits. Hopefully, further clarification from the UNCLOS
III conference will be forthcoming. Otherwise, the framers might find
132. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 44.
133. Moore, supra note 16, at 103.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 103-04. Moore makes the point that the inclusion and cross-refer-
encing of article 233 allowing a strait state to suspend passage in instance of the threat
"of major environmental damage" would make no sense if the strait state already had
that power under article 39. Id.
137. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 25.
138. Burke, supra note 2, at 211. Burke has agreed in part with the non-transit
theory:
Of course a vessel which engages in an activity that is not an
exercise of transit passage can be excluded from passage and
the Text provides for this possibility in Article 37(3). But this
coastal competence is limited to specific transits because the
coastal state cannot suspend transit passage. The singular
purpose of this anti-suspension provision in Article 42 is to
confine coastal state competence to assessments of individual
instances of passage.
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they have negotiated for a new straits regime that may turn out to be
the old regime in disguise.
Nevertheless, the transit passage proposal is a good faith effort at
compromise between the strait states' need for regulatory competence
and the maritime powers' need for free and unrestricted passage. The
overall result is a regime more sympathetic to the needs of the mari-
time powers.
Submerged Passage
An issue of great importance to the maritime powers is whether
the proposed transit passage text secures the right of submerged pas-
sage for submarines operating in the affected straits.
Michael Reisman has argued that the answer to this question has
implications for the survival of mankind.' He claims that the right of
submerged passage is an indispensable element in the world's nuclear
deterrence system.140 Since nuclear submarines are the arm of the triad
most likely to survive a first-strike nuclear attack, they represent the
greatest deterrent against any nation making such an attack.1 ' But the
nuclear submarines' ability to survive a first strike and deliver a retali-
atory blow is in large part dependent on their ability to navigate unde-
tected. 142 Since submerged passage is relatively undetected passage,
the superpowers (and the world in general) have a vital interest in se-
curing that right under the transit passage regime.
43
Under the regime of innocent passage, submerged passage is not
allowed."44 Submarines are required to surface while transiting through
territorial waters.'45 This was a major reason for the maritime powers'
dissatisfaction with the innocent passage regime."" A twelve-mile terri-
139. See Reisman, supra note 75, at 48.
140. Id.
141. Knight states the United States argument as such: "[slince our second-
strike capability is vested essentially in our Polaris/Poseidon fleet, the mobility and un-
detectability of that fleet must be maintained at all costs. Requiring vessels of the Pola-
ris/Poseidon fleet to surface when passing through international straits creates an unac-
ceptable exposure." Knight, supra note 7, at 778.
142. See Reisman, supra note 75, at 52. See also Pirtle, supra note 47, at 488.
143. Reisman, supra note 75, at 48-49. Reisman argues that it is in the common
interest of all nations to maintain the nuclear deterrence system. It is a "pre-requisite to
general survival." Id. For the view that the Soviet Union, with the world's largest sub-
marine fleet, shares United States concerns on the straits issue, see Smith, supra note 6,
at 534.
144. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 20.
145. Id.
146. See Burke, supra note 2, at 196.
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torial sea in the straits would be acceptable to the maritime powers
only under a new regime ensuring submerged passage."1
7
Surprisingly, the final text of the transit passage articles does not
expressly provide for the right of submerged passage. This has led to
the claim that such a right may not be protected.""8 On the other hand,
it is important to note that such a right is not expressly prohibited, as
under innocent passage."1 9
Authorities who maintain that transit passage does include a
right of submerged passage point invariably to article 38(2), which
reads in part: "Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with
this Part of the freedom of navigation . . . . "' Their contention is
that the phrase "freedom of navigation" in international law has al-
ways included the right of submerged passage."5
Burke states that article 38(2) assures a right of submerged pas-
sage by expressly associating the transit passage regime with the tradi-
tional right of the high seas.' He argues that it is an "eminently rea-
sonable interpretation . . . to construe the term 'freedom of
navigation' as embracing submerged passage, especially in light of the
fact that mention of this freedom is unaccompanied by any restrictions
which would suggest that only surface transit was intended."'5 s
Even though the right of transit passage includes a reference to
"freedom of navigation," it has been argued that there are so many
qualifications under the transit passage regime that it is obvious that
the phrase is being used in a different context than it would be used in
reference to the open seas.'5 In the transit passage context, it follows
147. See Moore, supra note 16, at 100.
148. Reisman, supra note 75, at 71.
149. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 20. It reads: "In the territorial sea,
submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to
show their flag." Id.
150. Id. art. 38(2).
151. Moore, supra note 16, at 98. Moore states:
The existing 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and
the high seas chapter of the ICNT both speak only of "free-
dom of navigation." They do not spell out a right of sub-
merged transit beyond use of that phrase. Yet such rights on
the high seas are understood by all to include the right of sub-
merged transit.
Id.
152. Burke, supra note 2, at 205.
153. Id.
154. H. Knight, Analysis of the "Revised Single Negotiating Text" and the Ques-
tion of the Right of Submerged Transit Through International Straits (Aug. 1, 1976)
(unpublished memorandum on file with the Washington Law Review).
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that no right of submerged passage should be implied.15 5
Burke agrees that "freedom of navigation" in article 37(2) is be-
ing used in a different context than it would be used in reference to the
open seas."" He states that the framers "did not mean to carry over
and to protect the whole panorama of operational practices protected
by freedom of navigation in its traditional usage. 1 57 He does believe,
however, that one of the practices preserved under the transit passage
version of "freedom of navigation" is submerged passage, and that the
negotiating history supports this view.'"8
Submerged submarines should have no problem meeting the vari-
ous criteria for transit passage. 15 For example, article 39(1)(c) states
that ships and aircraft during their passage should "refrain from any
activities other than those incident to their normal mode of continuous
and expeditious transit." ' 60 A submerged submarine would seem to
have no problem complying with this article. As Burke points out, the
article "contemplates vehicles which differ in their method of move-
ment insofar as they operate in their 'normal mode.' " The framers
must have had submarines in mind when they drafted such an article,
since submerged is certainly the "normal mode" for a submarine.
62
There is not, however, total consensus on this point. Reisman
claims that the meaning of the phrase "normal mode" could vary ac-
cording "to such factors as type of channel, density of traffic, safety
factors, nature of mission, rules of the road, and so on. What may be
normal in internal or territorial waters would be 'abnormal' on the high
seas, and so on. 1 63 Therefore, submarines could be required to surface
when a strait state determines that submerged is not the "normal
155. Reisman, supra note 75, at 70.
156. Burke, supra note 2, at 207.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
160. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 39(1)(c).
161. Burke, supra note 2, at 212.
162. Moore, supra note 16, at 81. John Norton Moore has written that:
Modern nuclear submarines run safest "in their normal
mode," that is, submerged, and it is a mode for which they are
designed. On the surface they are less maneuverable, their sys-
tems for avoiding collision work less well, they are difficult to
see even with good visibility, they present only a small and
possibly misleading radar target for other shipping seeking to
avoid them, and they must travel in an area of higher density
of shipping with consequent increased risk of collision.
Id.
163. Reisman, supra note 75, at 71.
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mode" of transit in a given situation.' 64
Another requirement of transit passage that submerged subma-
rines would seem to easily meet is that of "continuous and expeditious
transit" called for by article 38(2).16 Submarines travel most expedi-
tiously and efficiently in the submerged mode.'"
Since there is no express prohibition of submerged passage under
transit passage, can a permission be inferred from that absence of pro-
hibition? Reisman points out that since there is no requirement for
submarines to surface, unlike the requirement of article 20'11 in the
innocent passage regime, it is possible to infer a permission to remain
submerged.'" But what might be inferred and what will be inferred are
two different items. In a world where international agreements tend to
be interpreted "strictly and textually," the failure of the maritime
states' negotiators to demand explicit inclusion of those understand-
ings vital to their own interests is dismaying.'
6 9
When confronted with both a lack of clear language in the text
and ambiguity, the Vienna Convention would mandate an examination
of the negotiating history and the preparatory work to the treaty to
help supplement the text.'
7 0
Maritime power treaty supporters state that negotiators under-
stood transit passage to include the right of submerged passage.17 1
Moore, relying on his own experience as the United States representa-
tive to UNCLOS III, states emphatically that the intent of the parties
was undeniable on this point, that the right of submerged passage was
understood by all participants to be included under the transit passage
regime, and that it was understood further that any treaty not includ-
164. See id. at 70-71.
165. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 38(2).
166. Moore, supra note 16, at 81.
167. Draft Convention, supra note 10, art. 20.
168. Reisman, supra note 75, at 71.
169. Id.
170. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 22,
1969, arts. 31-32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969); Accord
Robertson, supra note 12, at 845-46.
171. See Burke, supra note 2, at 205. Burke states:
Each of these delegations questioned the need for, and desira-
bility of, submerged passage for submarines. The comments,
questions, and proposals advanced by these delegations [Sri
Lanka, Egypt, Peru and Spain] are virtually impossible to ex-
plain unless they understood that submerged passage was in-
tended to be included in the concept of "freedom of naviga-
tion" in straits.
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ing such a right was unacceptable to the United States. 7 s
An examination of the negotiating history reveals that even those
who opposed the idea of submerged passage accepted the fact that it
existed under transit passage.'
There is agreement among those who were most directly involved
in the negotiating process that transit passage includes the right of
submerged passage. '7  The failure of the negotiators to have this ex-
pressly stated, however, leaves open the possibility that this textual
ambiguity may be interpreted in the future to deny submerged pas-
sage. 7 5 Certainly it would have been more consistent with the general
interest of the maritime states to have had the right of submerged pas-
sage expressly provided for, but at this late point in the negotiations,
any effort to renegotiate may be perceived by other nations as a delay-
ing tactic on the part of the United States and other maritime
powers.
76
A textual reading of the transit passage articles does not flatly
rule out the right of submerged passage, and a contextualist approach
generally supports the contention that such a right was understood to
be incorporated by the parties to the treaty-making process.17 7 On this
basis, the maritime powers can probably be assured that the right of
transit passage will be protected under the Draft Convention.
CONCLUSION
Any overall analysis of the proposed transit passage regime must
address itself to several questions: Does the regime satisfy the basic
demands of the maritime powers? Does it represent any improvement
over innocent passage? What are the alternatives?
Clearly, the maritime powers could not expect any straits regime
to satisfy all their demands. The strait states had expectations that
also had to be considered, especially in the area of traffic safety and
172. Moore, supra note 16, at 102.
173. In fact, early proposals to require submarines to surface under the transit
passage regime were rejected by the negotiators. Id. at 101. See also Oxman, The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 Am.
J. INT'L L. 57, 64 (1978).
174. See Moore, supra note 16, at 102.
175. For a discussion of ambiguties in legal agreements, see Reisman, supra note
75, at 75.
176. There is already great dissatisfaction in the world community over the Rea-
gan Administration's decision to delay United States approval of the UNCLOS III treaty
pending a policy review. The Administration's reservations center around the seabed is-
sue. See Frank, supra note 2, at 121-23.
177. Burke, supra note 2, at 203-09.
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environmental pollution. 17  Since the expectations of the maritime
powers and the strait states were in conflict 1 79 on many issues, a pro-
cess of compromise was resorted to in formulating a transit passage
regime. It would be both shortsighted and unreasonable for the mari-
time powers to expect a straits regime that conceded to all their de-
mands at the expense of the strait states' interests. 8 0
Unless the expectations of all parties to a written agreement are
at least in part satisfied, there is no incentive for them to ratify it.l81
Only when all parties perceive some satisfaction of their demands and
expectations will an agreement be recognized as authoritative law.
Only an agreement representing some generally recognized consensus
of values will provide the certainty and stability essential to ensure
that the maritime powers' vital interests will be protected.'
The regime of transit passage represents a compromise that
emerged from a long process of negotiation. It would appear to be a
substantial improvement over the innocent passage regime insofar as it
meets the expectations of the maritime powers. In the absence of ratifi-
cation of the UNCLOS III Treaty, however, the maritime powers
would be confronted with innocent passage in the straits.
Any suggestion by the maritime powers at this point to substan-
tially rewrite the transit passage section would seriously alienate the
strait states. The treaty is ready for approval by the whole conven-
tion. ' Therefore, while it would be in the maritime powers' interest to
178. The coastal states incorporated many interests into their demands during
the treaty-making process. According to two commentators:
The RSNT (Proposed Draft) attempts to resolve the conflict-
ing interests of maritime states and coastal states. The inter-
ests which coastal states have sought to further in the RSNT
include exploitation and management of resources in the sea
and seabed contiguous to their shores, and extension of their
territorial sea in order to regulate a greater portion of offshore
foreign maritime activity such as naval exercises, surveillance,
and the discharge of pollutants from ships.
Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 528.
179. Id.
180. Moore, supra note 16, at 119-20.
181. For a discussion of the need for international consensus on issues concern-
ing the law of the sea if our vital interests are to be secured, see Richardson, National
Security and the Law of the Sea (July 13, 1974) (Remarks by Ambassador-at-Large El-
liot L. Richardson, Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea
Conference).
182. See Moore, supra note 16, at 120.
183. See Frank, supra note 2, at 121-23. While this note was being prepared for
publication, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea approved a
treaty which the United States opposed. See supra note 31.
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have certain express stipulations included in the text (e.g., submerged
passage), this should be done only if it would cause no significant de-
lay. There is also the possibility that any attempt to reopen negotia-
tions will result in the strait states placing new demands on the table.
Absent any further amendment, an overall analysis of transit pas-
sage reveals it to be a solution that adequately addresses the needs of
the maritime powers. Though it is not perfect, it does represent a supe-
rior alternative to the present regime of innocent passage.
Edward J. Frank
